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RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT:
DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN LAW
Andr6 Bruyneel
MR. HAWES: Now, we would like to hear where Europe--if one
may unitize the term in this fashion (and I am sure one may not)--
where Europe fits on the spectrum of neutrality or antagonism or
welcoming of foreign investment.
1. INTRODUCTION
MR. BRUYNEEL: It is rather awkward, for various reasons, to
treat this topic. First, under the label "European Law" are in-
cluded not only international and EEC regulations but also about
twenty national legal systems from Iceland to Turkey--even after
leaving out East European countries. The documentation we have
collected--though, of course, incomplete--stands three feet high,
while only twenty minutes have been provided for my address.
Second, the topic is but partly a matter of law; for example,
authors rarely comment on the administrative remedies available a-
gainst a decision to refuse an authorization. Basically, the rules
depend on economic policy. Moreover, the sources of the law are
relatively difficult to use. These are either statutory provisions
--frequently complicated and poorly drafted--that are far from the
actual administrative practice [1], or they are descriptions, such
as the OECD documents, prepared on the basis of inquiries made ex-
clusively to national administrations (2].
Third, numerous factors that are unrelated to the usual no-
tion of restrictions on foreign investment influence a decision to
invest abroad. Some of these factors may have a significant re-
strictive effect, for example, tax treatment of branches, antitrust
law 13], possible obligation to launch a public offer after acquir-
ing control of a company [4], intensity of labor involvement in
takeovers and mergers [5], and similar considerations. Thus, it is
essential not to go astray, despite the appeal of such side issues.
The final difficulty is that the topic seems somewhat para-
doxical in a period when the general trend in Europe is character-
ized by some withdrawal of foreign branches and subsidiaries. Be-
cause of this curtailment and, more particularly, in order to
*It is my privilege to thank Mr. Marc Kadaner, member of the
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helpful assistance in collecting a major part of the documentation.
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neys, civil servants, central bank or bank officials, etc.) who
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stabilize employment, there is serious competition for systemati-
cally attracting and retaining foreign investment--not for setting
up new restrictions [6]. Rather low stock price quotations (which
can stimulate takeovers under good financial conditions), together
with massive public grants and various other factors, explain the
persistence of an important though reduced flow of foreign invest-
ment in Europe [7].
I shall try to meet the challenge of my topic, however, by
immediately making clear three limits on my discussion. I shall
consider only (1) significant and direct restrictions on foreign
direct investment--thus investments abroad and portfolio investments
will be excluded; (2) general rules--thus restrictions specific to
any particular economic sector, with the exception of banking, will
be disregarded; (3) the most prevalent restrictions--because it
would be difficult and tedious to describe the regulations existing
in about twenty different countries. I shall endeavor to sketch,
on the basis of some examples, the main types of investment restric-
tions before trying to evaluate their development and effectiveness.
Prior examination of some international and EEC aspects will be
necessary.
2. INTERNATIONAL AND EEC INFLUENCES
EEC law must, of course, be given precedence. However, it is
useful first to have a look at certain rules established by the OECD
to create a more traditional--and less explicit--framework for in-
ternational cooperation.
A. OECD Rules
Since 1961, the Member States (except Canada) have adopted
the OECD Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements (8]. According
to articles 1 and 2, the contracting parties commit themselves to
automatic authorization of transactions related to direct investments
in or from other OECD countries (these transactions are included in
OECD lists A/I/A and B). This rule of liberalization allows Member
States to declare reservations or national abrogations, although
these are rare as regards foreign direct investment. Here we find
the justification for a periodic examination and review of the cur-
rent situation by the Committee of Invisible Transactions and Capi-
tal Movements. National practices have consequently become more
open to public view, and they are the bases of an interesting docu-
mentation kept up-to-date and published by the OECD [9].
In addition to the Code on Capital Movements, the Declaration
on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises was issued
by the governments of OECD Member States on June 21, 1976 [10]. The
principal contents of the Declaration are (1) a recommendation that
multinational enterprises observe the Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises [11]; (2) a rather general statement on international
investment incentives and disincentives, together with a consulta-
tion procedure (which is never applied) in case of difficulties; and
(3) an endorsement of the principle of national treatment, to be
granted to foreign-controlled enterprises by each Member State.
Information concerning the application of this last principle
--in fields like taxation, governmental grants, access to bank cred-
its and financial markets, procurement contracts, and manufacturing
licenses--has been periodically published [12] and illustrates the
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not infrequent reluctance of national authorities to answer OECD
inquiries with clarity and completeness.
B. EEC Law
With the law of the European Communities, we enter a field
with much greater constraints on the national governments. Article
3(c) of the EEC Treaty provides for "the abolition, as between Mem-
ber States, of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, ser-
vices and capital," and this general principle is implemented in
title III of the Treaty. The free movement of goods is, of course,
the fourth fundamental EEC freedom [13]. I shall now comment only
on "freedom of establishment" and on "freedom of capital movements."
[141
(i) Freedom of establishment
(In fact, this means equal treatment, rather than a blanket
right of establishment.)
According to article 52, paragraph 1, "restrictions on the
freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the ter-
ritory of another Member State shall be abolished by progressive
stages in the course of the transitional period." The restraints
to be abolished include "restrictions on the setting up of agencies,
branches or subsidiaries" and restrictions on the right "to set up
and manage undertakings, in particular companies or firms." [15]
Article 52 was completed by the standstill clause of article
53, which prohibited the imposition of new restrictions, and by the
very important article 54, which established procedures and time
limits for the abolition of existing restrictions, assigned special
duties to the Council and the Commission [16], and authorized co-
ordination provisions [17].
According to the case law of the European Court of Justice
[18], the articles of the Treaty concerning all the freedoms--ex-
cept free movement of capital--are directly applicable to Member
States since the end of the transitional period: January 1, 1970.
This means that all restrictions are automatically abolished with-
out need for further directives. Furthermore, these articles of the
Treaty have created rights that may be enforced in court by indivi-
duals or companies against Member States, other individuals or cor-
porations (19] [20].
Except for capital-movement problems, hereafter discussed,
more restrictions on foreign investments among EEC countries have
been abolished as a result of application of the right of establish-
ment or of the Commission's pressure.
One Belgian example is worth noting. In order to protect
Belgian enterprises against foreign takeovers in conflict with na-
tional policy, the Act on Stock Exchanges was modified in 1967 to
require an authorization by the Minister of Finance in any case of
a public takeover bid launched by or on behalf of foreigners or
Belgian companies under direct or indirect foreign control [21].
On the basis of the right of establishment and the standstill clause,
the EEC Commission soon required the abolition of this new provi-
sion [22]. The Commission, clearly intending to make an example,
rejected all defenses presented by the Belgian government [23] and
threatened to bring the case before the Court of Justice in Luxem-
bourg [241.
[341]
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Finally, the law was changed in 1972, and the authorization
system was restricted to public takeover bids launched by non-EEC
foreigners [25]. After 1972--and before then as well--cases of
refusal of authorization were extremely rare [26] [27] [28]. Today,
the Commission is still active in its role of watchdog for the free-
dom of establishment. For example, it takes action against Member
States when it discovers bylaws of important industrial companies
or banks that prevent foreigners from becoming shareholders.
(ii) Free movement of capital
The unrestricted movement of capital involves a difficult
freedom. It is very closely linked to internal financial markets
and to their control--thus implicating economic policies that the
Treaty has basically left to the Member States. Articles 104 to
109 on the balance of payments (29] illustrate the necessary equi-
librium between the free movement of capital and the needs of na-
tional economic policies. These provisions, together with articles
67 to 73 on the free movement of capital [30], have created a situ-
ation which is complex and not uniform in all Member States.
According to article 106, paragraph 1, "each Member State
undertakes to authorize any payments connected with the movement of
goods, services or capital, and any transfers of capital . . . to
the extent that the movement of goods, services, capital and persons
between Member States has been liberalized pursuant to this Treaty."
[emphasis added]. Article 106 has thus automatically freed nearly
all current payments connected with the basic freedoms: the move-
ment of goods, workers, and services; and the right of establishment.
The situation is different for capital movements because ar-
ticle 67 is not directly binding on Member States [31]. However,
two directives of 1960 and 1962 [32] have eased restrictions on
many foreign exchange transactions, but to an extent that differs
according to four categories of transactions. For the first cate-
gory (list A of Annex I), transactions between EEC residents are
unconditionally freed; and the transactions of list A include direct
investments and real estate investments. [33]
Unfortunately for the principle of free movement and for list
A, in the Treaty there are also three safeguard clauses. Article
108 provides for Community response to difficulties in one Member
State as regards balance of payments; article 109 allows national
action in case of a sudden crisis in the balance of payments; and
article 73 deals with disturbances in the functioning of the capital
market.
The EEC achievements in the field of capital movements can
hardly be considered satisfactory. The situation differs from one
Member State to another, because list C includes only certain coun-
tries and because of the use of safeguard clauses in favor of France,
the U.K., Ireland, Denmark,and Italy [34]. Even for liberated trans-
actions, nothing has been done to reduce formalities, paperwork, and
stamps [35]. And, finally, the Commission did not succeed with its
1964 proposal for a third directive in the field of capital move-
ments [36].
At this moment, I should like to tell you an interesting
French story that demonstrates perfectly the vicious interaction
that is possible between exchange control objectives and the regu-
lation of foreign direct investments.
In 1967, exchange control was abolished in France, but at the
same time a system for controlling foreign investments was set up.
[342]
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Prior notification was required and the Minister of the Economy
retained a right of refusal (droit d'ajournement) for two months
after notification [37]. Then, for political reasons, France was
obliged to reinstitute exchange controls, first in May 1968 and then
on November 24, 1968. These measures were a posteriori legalized at
the EEC level--on the basis of the article 108 safeguard clause [381
--and they still remain in force.
However, the EEC Commission refused to accept the droit
d'ajournement as far as control of foreign direct investment was
concerned. An action was initiated in 1969 against France, for
(obvious, in my opinion) violation of article 52 freedom of estab-
lishment (39]. Finally, in 1971, the French government agreed to
cancel the droit d'ajournement; but, at the same time the exchange
control regulations were completed by the addition of an authoriza-
tion procedure for foreign direct investments [40).
As you can imagine, this authorization procedure was not in-
frequently used for purposes other than exchange control. There
were a number of cases of denial or failure to answer--which takes
longer for the applicant but has the legal effect of a refusal.
Some of these cases are well-known (like the Ferodo case) and have
created new difficulties between Paris and Brussels: in effect,
this authorization system, as applied, was contrary to the right of
establishment and was also a misuse of the exceptional safeguard
measures granted to France in 1968 in the field of exchange control
only.
The (perhaps temporary) end of the story came with the very
important Decree of August 4, 1980 [41], which has replaced--but
only for direct investments inside the EEC--the authorization sys-
tem by a mere notification that is supposed to be exclusively for
statistical purposes [42].
3. RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS
I would be going beyond my topic if I were to draft a cata-
logue of all existing restrictions [43]. But it seems worthwhile
to reduce my three-foot-high documentation to a short list of the
main types of restraints that I have discovered. These are the
most common restrictions: (1) exchange control restrictions, legi-
timate or misused, for the purpose of controlling foreign invest-
ments (e.g., Ireland, Italy, U.K. before 1979) [44]; (2) monetary
policy measures prohibiting any acquisition of national securities
(e.g., Switzerland in 1978-1979) [45]; (3) restrictions on acquisi-
tion of land and buildings (e.g., Finland, Switzerland since 1961)
[46].
As far as takeovers and the establishment of branches and
subsidiaries are concerned, these requirements are frequently en-
countered: (4) discretionary authorization--that is, the power to
prohibit (e.g., France for non-EEC investments, U.K., Spain, Norway,
Portugal) [47]; (5) special discretionary authorization in the
field of public takeover bids (e.g., Belgium for non-EEC investments)
[481; (6) prior notification for reasons of industrial policy (e.g.,
Belgium) [49]; (7) notification for statistical purposes--prior,
subsequent, or periodic (e.g., France for EEC investments, Germany)
(50]; (9) business permit for setting up a branch (e.g., Germany
for non-EEC investments, Spain) [51].
One could also mention a variety of other regulatory mandates:
[343]
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special permits (industrial, regional, pollution) [52], foreign
joint venture laws in Eastern Europe [53], compulsory residence for
the manager of a branch [54], residence, work, and foreign merchant
permits [55], consultation with professional councils [56], require-
ments applicable to transfer-of-technology agreements [57], and
rules for specific economic sectors such as national defense, trans-
portation, energy, nuclear industry, pharmaceutical industry, agri-
culture, insurance companies, and banks [58].
That is not all, because restrictions can also be found in
corporate law, specifying the nationality of founders [59], share-
holders [60], directors [61] or managers [62]. Less significant,
of course, are provisions requiring the mention of foreign directors
on the letterhead of the company [63] or the compulsory reporting
to the company of any shareholding in excess of twenty-five percent
[64].
Finally, purely private restrictions in company bylaws should
be mentioned as prohibitions against foreign shareholding [65]. For
example, the Swiss practice of titres nominatifs lies [66] grants
the board of directors the discretionary power to refuse new share-
holders. Thus, it is extremely difficult to achieve a successful
takeover against the wish of the board. In the field of private
restrictions, comment could also be added about U.K. situations (or,
more exactly, City situations) such as membership in Lloyd's [67]
or the membership of the Accepting Houses Committee [68].
4. DEVELOPMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF RESTRICTIONS
I do not want to leave you, after such a catalogue, with the
misleading impression that European thinking is basically hostile
to a liberal or neutral approach to the movement of capital. Some
very brief comments on recent developments and on the effectiveness
of restrictions may help you to understand where we really stand
on the other side of the Atlantic.
A. Developments
The only recent developments that can be considered very
significant are the 1979 abolition of exchange control in Great
Britain and the 1980 liberalization in France, mainly for EEC in-
vestments. In the long run, the principal trend is certainly to-
ward the reduction--in law and in fact--of existing restrictions.
As far as EEC countries are concerned, this trend has been stimu-
lated by EEC law on the right of establishment. Often in Member
States, the abolition of one or another restriction for EEC invest-
ments was extended to all foreign investments.
However, there is also a trend in the other direction, linked
to the development of more interventionist industrial and regional
policies in several countries. The application of such policies
rarely remains completely neutral with regard to equal treatment of
foreign investments.
B. Effectiveness
First of all, it should be kept in mind that many authoriza-
tion or prohibition devices--although very impressive as statutory
or regulatory texts--are never or very rarely applied [691.
Second, it should be noted that the effectiveness of statu-
[344]
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tory authorization or prohibition devices is not altogether evident.
Certainly, the private Swiss device of titres nominatifs 1i6s has
played a protective role for Swiss corporations that is much more
efficient than any governmental control of foreign direct invest-
ments [70].
Another example of the circumvention of official regulation
may be found in France. In November 1980--thanks to the abolition
of the authorization procedure for EEC investments--the Italian
group Ferruzzi took control of Beghin-Say, the number one French
sugar company. One month later, because of extremely heavy pres-
sures from the President, the French government, and French agri-
cultural circles, a "French solution" was found in agreement with
Ferruzzi [711. The Italian group had properly read the Circular of
1980, but apparently it forgot that the agriculture and food sector
had become private turf for the French.
Other examples of "national solutions" may be found in the
British or the German practice of takeovers [72], which are con-
trolled without the assistance of restrictive regulations.
Finally, with all their complicated regulations, are the
European governments better equipped than the British Foreign Office
was in 1890 when it simply said "no" to shareholders who were in-
tending to sell a controlling interest in the North-West Africa
Company to Leopold II, as King of the Congo [731? I leave the an-
swer to each of you, and I come to the last topic: restrictions
on foreign direct investment in the field of banking.
5. RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN BANKS
First, let me point out that up to now neither the EEC nor
any individual European country has established a corpus of national
and international banking regulations as complicated as that of the
U.S. (and I hope it will never happen). Even for a specialist, U.S.
rules can be reasonably characterized as a legal nightmare [74].
Before ending with some examples of restrictions in non-EEC coun-
tries, I shall consider foreign investments in EEC banks.
A. Within the EEC
The right-of-establishment principles which were discussed
earlier with regard to corporations [75] are also applicable to
the banking sector of the EEC. However, in a business that has
traditionally been protected and closely supervised, liberalization
is not so easy. As a matter of fact, right-of-establishment prob-
lems in banking are entangled with problems of freedom to render
services [76] and problems of capital movements [77]. From the
point of view of the EEC Treaty, most of the principal banking oper-
ations--such as granting credit, accepting deposits, issuing bonds,
buying and selling securities--are not services but are movements
of capital. Therefore, they are not yet fully liberated. Moreover,
national supervisory systems are usually based on the site of es-
tablishment [78].
Although this situation has not prevented achievements such
as the merger of the London and Dublin Stock Exchanges, the move-
ment of German banks to Luxembourg, or various examples of coopera-
tion between European banks in the seventies, it can be improved
only by means of the coordination procedures established by the
EEC Treaty [79].
[3451
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In the banking field [80] two directives have been adopted.
The first one is the "Council directive of 28 June 1978 [81] on the
abolition of restrictions on freedom of establishment and freedom
to provide services in respect of self-employed activities of banks
and other financial institutions." The second directive is the
"(first) Council directive of 12 December 1977 on the coordination
of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the
taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions" [82].
The present situation, resulting from the two directives and
their implementation [83], can be summed up in three comments.
(1) As regards the right of establishment, there are no longer any
significant restrictions on the formation in EEC Member States of
branches or subsidiaries of EEC credit institutions [84]. (2) There
remain, however, transitional difficulties to be solved concerning
the standard "economic needs of the market" and its application[851.
(3) Article 9 of the 1977 Directive deals with branches of credit
institutions whose head offices lie outside the Community [86]. On
the one hand, Member States may not apply a more favorable treatment
than the EEC treatment to such branches; on the other hand, the
Community may, through agreements with third countries on the basis
of reciprocity, accord to such branches identical treatment through-
out the EEC territory.
Presently no agreement of this kind exists, but it may be
said that the EEC freedom of establishment and the implementation
of banking directives have generally encouraged equal treatment of
branches and subsidiaries of EEC and non-EEC credit institutions.
This is perfectly illustrated by the U.K. Banking Act of 1979 which
made no distinction between EEC and non-EEC foreign banks [87].
As a matter of fact, current legal and practical banking
issues primarily concern supervision, and cooperation between super-
visory authorities [88], rather than restrictions on foreign invest-
ments in banks. The stronger the cooperation grows, the less im-
portant will be the need for restrictions.
B. Restrictions in Non-EEC Countries
Restrictions on foreign investment in banks still exist, how-
ever, inside the EEC--for non-EEC investors--as well as outside the
EEC--for all investors. In this second category, Switzerland and
Spain are two examples of countries with special treatment of for-
eign banks.
The Swiss situation is typical. The multiplication of for-
eign bank subsidiaries in Switzerland during the sixties led to the
introduction, in 1971 of special rules concerning "banks in foreign
hands" [89]. This statutory regime controlling foreign banking
subsidiaries [90] was built on the basis of two principles: (1)
The granting of a bank licence is subject to the traditional condi-
tion of reciprocity [91]. (2) Precautions must be taken to prevent
the subsidiary from giving the impression, because of its name,
that it is a Swiss bank. Rules are also designed to ensure a sig-
nificant allegiance to Switzerland in matters such as monetary and
credit policies, the residence of managers, and representation of
the subsidiary [92].
The application of such rules turned out--not surprisingly--
to be difficult. There is no clear standard defining a bank in
foreign hands (let us think of the example of a Swiss bank with
forty-five percent foreign shareholding), or the condition of
[3461
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol3/iss3/13
A. Brntnecl / Restrictions on foreign hnestient: Europe
reciprocity, which the Federal Banking Commission identifies through
a flexible, case-by-case approach [931.
The Spanish banking law, which had been extraordinarily re-
strictive toward foreign investment, was substantially liberalized
by a Royal Decree in 1978 [94] in accordance with the Spanish open-
door policy after Franco. The classical standard of reciprocity
was chosen, together with a discretionary authorization--based
on national economic interest--to be granted by the Council of
Ministers itself.
Apparently no European country presently has a provision
like the one contained in the Canadian Bank Act of 1967 which, until
1980, required seventy-five percent Canadian control of all federal-
ly chartered banks [95]. Furthermore, there is nothing comparable
to the provision of the Canadian Bank Act of 1980, restricting the
domestic assets of all foreign bank subsidiaries in the aggregate
to eight percent of total domestic assets of all banks in Canada[96].
MR. HAWES: Thank you, Andre. Assume that a client comes
to you wanting to make a direct investment--not a takeover bid,
but just to establish a subsidiary or to buy property. Take Bel-
gium, if you wish, and let us say it is an American company or in-
vestor. Would your approach be to say, "It is quite possible," or
"It is going to be very, very difficult"? Where does it fit in
that spectrum?
MR. BRUYNEEL: No doubt I would answer, "It will be easy, as
far as Belgium is concerned."
MR. HAWES: If you were a French lawyer or a German lawyer?
MR. BRUYNEEL: I would say, "Be very, very, very careful."
NOTES
[I] Sometimes there are very restrictive legal provisions that are never
applied (e.g., article 13 of the U.K. 1975 Industry Act), or there
may be restrictive administrative practices developed with or without
a basis in statutory law.
[2] See particularly, International Direct Investment (policies, pro-
cedures, and practices in OECD member countries), OECD publications,
1979.
[3] E.g., as far as EEC antitrust law is concerned, substantial diffi-
culties can arise with some types of joint ventures. See Lukoff,
Joint Ventures, EEC Theory and Developing Case Law, 2 The Interna-
tional Contract 37-44 (1981). In connection with Article 86 of the
Treaty, see the Continental Can case: Judgment of 21 February 1973,
[19731 ECR 215.
[41 See, e.g., General principle nr. 13 of the City Code on Take-overs
and Mergers (revised edition February 1981). An excellent compara-
tive study on the sale of controlling interest is Lempereur,
Cessions de majoritg et protection des actionnaires minoritaires
en droit compare, 1978 Revue Pratique des Socigt~s (Brussels) 91-187.
[ 3471
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15] E.g., such involvement is very important in the Netherlands with
respect to acquisitions (see Act on Workers' Councils, as amended
September 1, 1979) or public takeover bids and mergers (see
Fusiegedragsregelscode 1975, which is a resolution of the Social
and Economic Council).
[6] The trend will probably and unfortunately be very different in
the field of trade policies, at least for several sensitive sectors.
[7] For a description of the general trends, see the OECD documents
published from time to time by the Committee on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises.
[8] The most recent edition was published in 1978 by OECD publications.
The original 1961 Code was adopted after promulgation of the OECD
Code of Liberalization of Current Invisible Transactions. As re-
gards current payments, compare the IMF rules and the 1955 European
Monetary Agreement.
[9] International Direct Investment, supra note 2. This document shows,
inter alia, that national authorities do not always fully respond
to questions; that every government considers its practice to be
liberal; that exchange control is, as far as foreign investment is
concerned, a basically ambiguous matter; and that national statistics
are extremely difficult to compare--for example, the number of re-
fused authorizations or number of applications withdrawn.
[10] International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, OECD pub-
lications, ed. 1979. (1976 Declaration and Council's Decisions.)
fi] For a well-known application of this non-binding set of rules, see
the Badger case (1977): Blanpain, The Badger Case and the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Kluwer, 1977).
[12] National Treatment for Foreign-Controlled Enterprises, OECD publi-
cations, 1978; International Investment and Multinational Enter-
prises, supra note 10.
[13] EEC Treaty, title I.
[14] The freedom of movement for workers (articles 48 and 51) and the
freedom to provide services (articles 59 to 66) within the Com-
munity do not involve, at least directly, restrictions on foreign
investment. For a detailed description of EEC law on the four
freedoms, see Mclgret and others, Le droit de la Communaut6 econo-
mique europdenne, volume 3 (Brussels, 1971).
[15] Article 52 refers to the article 58 meaning of companies or firms
and to chapter 4 provisions on the free movement of capital. EEC
Treaty. The problem of dominion is therefore solved without refer-
ence to a theory of control.
[16] See article 54, para. 3(e)(f) and (h), EEC Treaty.
(17] Article 54, para. 3(g), pertaining to companies, and article 57,
para. 2 concerning the financial sector, EEC Treaty.
[348]
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[181 Reyners case: Judgment of 21 June 1974, case 21/74 [1974] ECR
631; Van Binsbergen case: Judgment of 3 December 1974, case
33/74 [1974] ECR 1299; and several subsequent cases aimed at
clarifying points of detail.
1191 The application of these principles concerning the right of estab-
lishment was in no respect modified or delayed by the Accession
Treaty of 1972 (Denmark, Ireland, and U.K.) or by the Accession
Treaty of 1979 (Greece).
[20] On the fundamental question of the "direct effect" of EEC Treaty
provisions, see Lecourt, L'Europe des juges 248-263 (Brussels, 1979).
Concerning the less direct effect of EEC directives, see Pescatore,
L'effet des directives communautaires: une tentative de ddmythifi-
cation, chron. XXV (Dalloz Sirey, 1980) (only the lack of implemen-
tation, or inadequate implementation, of a directive may be brought
as a cause of action, and only against a Member State); see also,
Timmermans, Directives: Their Effect Within the National Legal
Systems, 1979 Common Market Law Review 533-555.
[211 Commercial Code, book I, title V, article 108, §2; see Report to
the King, Pasinomie 1967, 1313-1314, pertaining to the traditionally
liberal attitude of the Belgian government and to the OECD Code of
1961.
122] In addition, the Commission was not pleased by the standard "company
under foreign control"--even as elucidated by the "general programmes"
of 18 December 1961: "lien effectif et continu avec l'conomie d'un
Etat membre".
[231 A declaration that article 108, §2 would never be applied to EEC
nationals, except after the procedure established by article 73 of
the EEC Treaty; the claim that enterprises in a small country are
particularly exposed to foreign takeovers; and other arguments.
See the legislative history of the Act of 1972, infra note 25.
[24] EEC Treaty, article 169.
[251 Act of 11 July 1972, Pasinomie 1972, 418-426, including the legis-
lative history and a description of similar restrictions in other
EEC countries. The new text of article 108, §2 is worded as follows:
The same authorization shall be required for any public
offer to exchange or to purchase Belgian securities,
realized by or for the account of:
1. physical persons other than nationals of a member
state of the European Economic Community;
2. corporate bodies, public or private, that are not
formed according to the law of one of these states;
3. corporate bodies, public or private, that are formed
according to the law of one of these states but that
do not have their registered office, administration
office or principal place of business within the
Community.
[26] An interesting case happened in the insurance field. The Minister
of Finance rejected a U.K. public takeover bid for a Belgian in-
surance company because the bidder, unlike another bidder, did not
undertake to maintain full employment in the Belgian company.
[3491
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[27] Public takeover bids are under the supervision of the Banking
Commission, which acts in order to protect investors, not in order
to evaluate the takeover. On that supervision, see Bruyneel,
The Belgian Commission Bancaire: Functions and Methods, 1980
DPCI 351-384 (up-to-date revision of an article published in the
Journal of Comparative Corporate Law and Securities Regulation,
1 J. Comp. Corp. L. & See. Reg. 187 (1978)).
[28] The Belgian government was also compelled to propose to Parliament
a modification of article 36 of the Act of 30 December 1970 on
economic expansion, which deals with incentives, grants, employment,
planning, and measures of industrial policy. Article 36 requires
prior notification to the Minister of Economic Affairs, the Minister
of Finance, and the Minister of Regional Economic Affairs in case of
sale to foreigners--or Belgian companies under direct or indirect
foreign control--of more than one third of the capital of a Belgian
enterprise with an equity of at least BF 100 million. The solution
finally adopted (Act of 17 August 1973) was not to lift the restric-
tion for EEC investors as with article 108; but instead, the prior
notification system was extended to all sales, even to Belgian nationals.
[29] Chapter 2 of title II of the EEC Treaty.
[30] Article 67: principle; articles 68 and 69: program, procedure, and
directives; articles 70 and 72: coordination of the exchange poli-
cies towards third countries; article 71: standstill clause;
article 70, para. 2 and article 73: safeguard clauses. See also
article 221: national treatment respecting participation in the
capital of companies or firms.
The consistency and combination of the two sets of rules (67 to
73; 104 to 109) is a difficult matter: see M1gret et al., supra
note 14, volume 3, at 173-259; Heenen, La libre circulation des
capitaux, in Novelles, Droit des Communaut6s europ~ennes 755-772
(Brussels, 1969).
On escape clauses, see Manin, A propos des clauses de sauvegarde,
1970 Rev. trim. dr. eur. 1-42; Seidel, Escape Clauses in European
Community Law-', 1978 Common Market Law Review 283-308 (uith special
reference to capital movements).
[31) Mdgret et al., supra note 14, volume 3, at 177. The European Court
of Justice will soon deal with this problem.
(32] First directive of 11 May 1960 (JOCE nr. 43 of 12 July 1960);
second directive of 18 December 1962 (JOCE nr. 9 of 22 January 1963).
[33] Compare list B, where transactions such as portfolio investments in
quoted securities are unconditionally made free on the basis of
general exchange authorizations; list C, where transactions are
conditionally made free-i.e., only in Member States (Germany, Belgium,
Luxembourg) where such freedom already existed in 1960; and list D,
where transactions that might involve speculative capital movements
are not necessarily freed by the Member States. The four lists were
based on the corresponding liberalization work of the OECD Code of
1961.
[34] See also article 49 ff, 1979 Accession Treaty with Greece.
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[351 For example, it must be determined whether a transaction is to
be found on list A or on another list. The same odd practice
exists in systems of two-tier exchange markets--as in Belgium.
[36] See N1gret et al., supra note 14, volume 3, at 210-215. The EEC's
rather minimal achievement in the field of capital movements can
be explained by various factors: treaty objectives are less pre-
cise than for the other freedoms; there is a lack of clarity and
consistency between articles 67 to 73 and articles 104 to 109;
political will was weak and there was no precise conception of an
ideal European capital market. This situation led to the "Rapport
Segre": Le d~veloppement d'un marche europgen des capitaux, EEC
publication nr. 8.181 (1966) which is at the origin of EEC efforts
in other directions: inter alia, coordination in the banking field,
securities markets, and economic and monetary union. See MNgret
et al., supra note 14, volume 6 at 29-134.
137] Decree nr. 67-78 of 27 January 1967 and subsequent decrees and
circulars issued according to Act nr. 66-1008 of 28 December 1966.
[381 Decree nr. 68-1021 of 24 November 1968 issued according to Act No.
66-1008, id. EEC decisions of 23 July 1968 (JOCE nr. L 178 of 25
July 1968) and of 4 December 1968 (JOCE nr. L 295 of 7 December
1968). The validity of the application of articles 108 and 109 of
the EEC Treaty has been contested, but not successfully. See
Judgment of 2 February 1976, Tribunal de grande instance de Lille,
Dalloz Sirey [1979] jur. 241-245, note Minet.
[391 Appeal nr. 66/69 filed, but never heard, at the European Court of
Justice. See NWgret et al., supra note 14, volume 3 at 218-228;
see also the EEC answer to a parliamentary question in 1969: 1970
Rev. trim. dr. eur. 183-184 (which refers to articles 52-58 (and
directives), article 221, and article 67 (and 1960 directives)).
[401 Decree nr. 71-144 of 22 February 1971 replacing article 4 of Decree
nr. 68-1021, supra note 38; see also Decree nr. 74-721 of 26 July
1974, introducing a new article 4 bis in Decree nr. 68-1021.
[41] Journal officiel of 5 August 1980. Article 4 bis of Decree nr.
68-1021 is now worded as follows:
10 Les investissements directs effectugs Vint'rieur
de la Communaut6 6conomique europ~enne qui repondent aux
deux conditions suivantes sont libres
with three exceptions:
Les investissements effectues dans des activitfs participant
en France, m~me A titre occasionnel, i l'exercice de l'auto-
rit4 publique; les investissements mettant en cause l'ordre
public ou la sant4 publique ou la s~curit4 publique, ainsi
que ceux r~alises dans des activit9s de production ou de
commerce d'armes, de munitions et de materiels de guerre;
les operations ayant pour effect de faire 6chec l'applica-
tion des lois et r~glementations francaises.
[ 3511
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[42] On the basis of the Decree of 4 August 1980, there has been
published a very comprehensive new Circular of 6 August 1980,
Journal officiel of 9 August 1980. The Circular is interesting
in many respects: it gives a detailed and extensive definition of
control; it excludes EEC companies under foreign control; and
it contains other measures liberalizing small-sized foreign
direct investments in France.
[43] Attempts to draft such a catalogue were made in the two OECD
documents referred to in notes 9 and 12 supra. Other interesting
sources include a booklet published by Abecor in 1976: Investisse-
ments etrangers en Europe; the Tax Management series; and booklets
published for each country (Investment in ... ) by firms like Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
Such introductory sources must be complemented by an examination
of the legal texts and also by meetings designed to provide a satis-
factory understanding of administrative practices. I bad such con-
tacts in several countries but, due to lack of time, I cannot comment
on the various interesting discoveries I made and the conclusions
that can be drawn.
[44] Also problems of repatriation of income or investment. The
misuse of exchange control is particularly clear when the control
was established in order to avoid excessive outflow of capital.
1451 The abolition of the Federal Council Decree on investment by non-
residents in Swiss securities became effective on 24 January 1979.
[46] "Lex Furgler": Decree of the Federal Assembly of 23 March 1961;
Federal Council Decree of 21 December 1973. The system, which is
presently under review, has apparently never been used to prevent a
subsidiary or a branch from buying land and buildings necessary for
its industrial activity.
[47] France: see section 2B(ii) supra at 144 and notes 37 to 42.
U.K.: see article 13 of the 1975 Industry Act concerning change
of control contrary to the interests of the U.K. or any substantial
part thereof. Spain: see Decrees of 31 October 1974 and Royal
Decree of 26 November 1976, pertaining to foreign direct investment
in excess of 50% of the capital of a Spanish company. Norway: see
International Direct Investment, supra note 2. Portugal: see
Foreign Investment Code: Decree-Act nr. 348/77.
[48] Article 108, paragraph 2 of the Act on stock exchanges. See
section 2B(i) supra at 143 and notes 25 to 27.
[49] Article 36 of the Act of 30 December 1970: see supra note 28.
[501 France: see section 2B(ii) supra at 144 and notes 37 to 42. Germany:
see Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz (AWG), §1.
[51] Germany: see Gewerbeordnung (GewO), §12. The permit may be refused
for lack of reciprocity. Spain: authorization of the Ministry of
Commerce: see Decree of 31 October 1974 articles 13-14.
[52] E.g., in the Netherlands.
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1531 E.g., in Yugoslavia, see the Act of 30 March 1978 on foreign
investments (comprehensive commentary in 1980 DPCI 385-415).
See in general, Florescu, Les socigtos rixtes dans les pays
socialistes, nouvelle forme de coop6ration 4conomique interna-
tionale, 1978 DPCI 243-267.
154] Frequently required by tax regulations.
(55] In all countries, except for EEC nationals in Member States.
A particularly restrictive policy in this respect has been
followed by Switzerland for several years; see Revaclier,
Obstacles 2 l'implantation d'entreprises 6trang<res en Suisse:
les dispositions limitant le nombre des trangers qui exercent
une activit6 lucrative, 1976 DPCI 89-99.
[56] E.g., in Austria.
(571 E.g., in Spain.
[581 As far as banks are concerned, see section 5 infra at 147.
[591 E.g., in Denmark at least two founders must be Danish (Company
Act, article 11 for A/S), but this requirement has been lifted
for EEC nationals.
160] E.g., in Finland the bylaws may limit foreign shareholdings to
20% of the capital: International Direct Investment, supra note 2,
at 23.
[611 E.g., in Denmark at least half of the directors must be Danish
(Company Act, article 52 for A/S), but this requirement has been
lifted for EEC nationals. In Switzerland a majority of the
directors of an S.A. must be Swiss nationals residing in Switzer-
land, with a possibility of exemption for holding companies (Code
des obligations, art. 711, para.2).
[62] E.g., in Denmark (Company Act, article 52 for A/S), but this re-
quirement has been lifted for EEC nationals.
163] U.K. Company Act of 1948, article 201. This requirement has been
lifted for EEC nationals.
[64] German Aktiengesetz, article 20. The company is in turn obliged
to publish any information it receives on such shareholding in
excess of 25 percent.
(65] See section 2B(i) supra at 143 for the position of EEC nationals.
[66] Stimulated by the Federal Council as far as banks are concerned.
[67] However, Lloyd's has had foreign "names" since 1968.
(68] Anthony Gibbs, after becoming a subsidiary of the Hong Kong and
Shanghai Bank, withdrew from the Committee.
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[69] E.g., article 13 of the U.K. 1975 Industry Act has never been applied;
also it apparently was never cormnunicated to the OECD. See Weinberg,
On Take-over and Mergers (nr. 1505, 1979 ed.). In Belgium, article
108, para. 2 of the Act on stock exchanges, supra note 48, has been
applied only extremely rarely. See also the statistical data pub-
lished in International Direct Investment, supra note 2. It should
be noted, however, that the length of the authorization procedure
has sometimes in fact resulted in the prevention of an investment.
(70] Compare, for example, the rather minor importance of branches and
subsidiaries of multinational enterprises in Switzerland with the
very high figures for Belgium. It is interesting to note that the
investments of Belgian Multinational Enterprises abroad are also of
similar great importance.
[71] L'Express (Paris), 6 December 1980; Le Soir (Brussels), 4 December
1980.
[72] In Germany, there is even a gentleman's agreement among the banks,
several business and industry organizations, and the federal
government, which provides that no sale of the control of an
enterprise will be made to foreigners without consultation.
[73] Barbara Emerson, Leopold II: The Kingdom and the Empire, chapter
XXI (London, 1979).
[74] See Yellon and Welsh, Counseling Foreign Banks on United States
Bank Acquisitions: The Foreign Banker Meets His U.S. Lawyers,
2 J. Comp. Corp. L. & See. Reg. 303-333 (1979).
[75] See section 2B(i) supra at 143.
[76] EEC Treaty, articles 59 to 66.
[77] See section 2B(ii) supra at 144.
(78] On these problems, see the very interesting paper presented by Mr.
Troberg, Freedom of Establishment, Freedom to Supply Services:
The Field of Financial Institutions and Their Operation, at the
1980 Brussels Seminar of the International Faculty for Corporate
and Capital Markets Law (available from the editors of this journal].
See also, Judgment of 26 November 1975 (Coenen), (1975] ECR 1547
(as an exception to the general rule, a location and a permanent
address may be required for services of a special nature that need
supervision which can be effected only on the spot).
[79] See, in general, articles 100 and 101, and especially in reference
to banks, articles 57, para. 2 and 61, para. 2; see also articles
54, para. 2 and para. 3, and 63, para. 2 and para. 3.
(80] The EEC directives or proposals or Codes of conduct in the area of
securities markets and regulations will not be treated here, for
they are more closely related to problems of foreign portfolio
investment and foreign issues than to problems of foreign direct
investment. The same is true for directives, and proposals for
directives, in the corporate and accounting fields.
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[81] OJEC, nr. L 194 of 16 July 1973. See, as regards freedom to
provide banking services, the interesting Judgment of 24 October
1978 (Socigt G~ngrale Alsacienne de Banque), (19781 ECR 1971.
[821 OJEC, nr. L 322 of 17 December 1977. An excellent and comprehen-
sive comment on the directive of 1977 has been published by Le
Brun, Une premiere etape vers 1'harmonisation europeenne des
r~glementations bancaires, 1979 Revue de la Banque (Brussels) 25-57.
See also the paper presented by Mr. Clarotti, The Harmonization of
Legislation Relating to Credit Institutions, at the 1980 Brussels
Seminar of the International Faculty for Corporate and Capital
Markets Law [available from the editors of this journal].
[83] The time limit for implementation of the 1977 directive was
December 1979; but several Member States have not yet complied.
[84] For an interesting general view on the present situation, see IBRO,
The Regulation of Banks in the Member States of the EEC (1978).
[851 See article 3 of the 1977 directive, and Le Brun, supra note 82,
nr. 2.2.1.4.
[86] See also Le Brun, supra note 82, nr. 2.2.3, and, as regards
branches of EEC credit institutions, nr. 2.2.2.2. With respect
to the subsidiaries of non-EEC credit institutions, an issue not
covered by article 9, see Le Brun, L'harmonisation des ligislations
bancaires et les autorit~s nationales de contrale, in The Develop-
ment of Financial Institutions in Europe, 1956-1976, at 350 ff.
(Sijthoff-Leiden, 1977).
187] Banking Act 1979, chapter 37, HMSO 1979; see also Watson, The
U.K. Banking Act 1979, 1980 DPCI 71-81; and Revell, The Regulation
on Banks and the New English Banking Law, 1981 Revue de la Banque
(Brussels) 5-28.
[88] And even competition among authorities. See Giddy and Allen,
International Competition in Bank Regulation, 1979 Banca Nazionale
des Lavoro Quarterly Review 311-326; compare Revell, The Complemen-
tart Ntature of Competition and Regulation in the Financial Sector,
1980 Revue de la Banque (Brussels) 9-32.
[891 Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks, 8 November 1934, revised on
11 March 1971. By an "urgent" vote, new rules on foreign banks were
first introduced by a Federal Decree of 21 March 1969. A new revi-
sion of the Act is presently in preparation.
[90] As regards branches, see Decree of the Federal Banking Commission
of 14 September 1973.
[911 This requirement can also be found in many other European countries,
including EEC countries. For example, Italy demands reciprocity
for non-EEC subsidiaries and The Netherlands, for non-EEC branches.
See items 25 and 27 of the summary table that forms the annex to
IBRO, supra note 84, and its corresponding chapters. Clearly, the
content and the application of the requirement of reciprocity may be
extremely different from one country to another. Such differences
also result from the degree of independence of the authority in charge
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of granting licences; this may be an independent commission as in
Switzerland or Belgium, the central bank, the Minister of Finance,
or the government itself.
[92] Hirsch, La surveillance des banques en Suisse, in Festschrift fur
Johannes Bgrmann at 467 (Munchen, 1975):
La raison sociale de ces banques ne doit pas permettre
de penser qu'il s'agit de banques suisses. D'autre part,
la banque "en maine Strangires" doit donner Zi la Banque
Nationale 1'assurance qu'elle adh~rera t la politique
suisse en matiere montaire et dans le domaine du credit;
elle est tenue de donner certains renseignements a la
Banque Nationale i cet effet. En outre, la majorit6 des
membres de la direction doit tre domiciliee en Suisse;
ceux qui sont domicili(s a 1'etranger ne peuvent pas
signer individuellement ni collectivement entre eux.
Toutes ces r~gles ne soulevent pas de difficult's.
[93] See Hirsch, supra note 92, at 467-468; Hirsch, La Commission
f & rale des banques en 1974, La socitg anonyme suisse, at 51-53;
Chapuis, Le statut des banques &trangores en Suisse, 1976 DPCI
119-138; Hlller, La surveillance des bangues en Suisse, 1980 Revue
de la Banque (Brussels) 61-76.
194] Real Decreto nr. 1388/78 of June 1978 on foreign banks in Spain;
see Fernandez Rozas, La nouvelle r4glementation de la banque
6trang~re en Espagne, 1978 DPCI 363-381. The first draft of the
decree was still significantly restrictive.
[95] See Engle, International Investment, 9 Harv. Int'l L.J. 305-317 (1968).
[96] Bank Act 1980, chapter 40; see Robinson, Hoffstein and Thompson,
Foreign Banks in Canada - The Door Opens, 2 The International
Contract 11-20 (1981).
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